In this paper, we provide results on the global security numbers of paths, cycles and their Cartesian products.
Introduction
Let G = (V , E) be a graph. S in G, respectively. We omit the subscript G when the graph under consideration is clear. Notation not introduced in this paper follows [15] .
Consider a situation where every vertex y ∈ N[S] − S chooses a neighbor in N(y) ∩ S to attack. Given such a choice for all vertices in N[S] − S, every vertex x ∈ S may choose a vertex in N [x] ∩ S to defend. The attack is defended if, for every vertex v ∈ S, the number of vertices attacking v is at most the number of vertices defending v, and S is a secure set if any given attack can be defended. A formal definition can be found in [1] . While the formal definition is precise, it is cumbersome to work with. Instead, the following characterization given in [1] serves as our working definition. The cardinality of a minimum secure set of G is the security number of G, denoted s(G). Previous work on secure sets and security numbers can be found in [1, [4] [5] [6] [7] 11, 14] . The set S is a dominating set if N [S] = V . The reader may refer to [9, 10] for a review on dominating sets. Set S is a global secure set if S is a dominating set and a secure set. The cardinality of a minimum global secure set of G is the global security number of G, denoted γ s (G). Note that a global secure set is different from a secure dominating set, studied in [3, 8, 13] .
Theorem 1 ([1, Theorem 11]). A non-empty set S ⊆ V is secure if and only if ∀X ⊆ S, |N[X] ∩
Set S is a total dominating set if S is a dominating set and the subgraph of G induced by S contains no isolated vertex. The cardinality of a minimum total dominating set of G is denoted γ o (G), following the notation of [2] . The Cartesian product of two graphs G and H is a graph denoted G × H, where
The class of graphs which contains exactly P n , C n , P n × P m , P n × C m and C n × C m is the class of grid-like graphs.
A lower bound on the global security number of an arbitrary graph may be obtained using Theorem 1. The following result is proven in [12] .
In [12] , upper bounds on the global security numbers of grid-like graphs were established by exhibiting global secure sets for these graphs. For graph G, an upper bound of ⌈|V (G)|/2⌉, along with Lemma 2, implies γ s (G) = ⌈|V (G)|/2⌉. This is the case for all grid-like graphs, with the exceptions stated in Theorem 3. In this paper, we show that γ s (
Global secure sets of
Proof. Let G = C 4k+2 . By Theorem 3, 2k+1 ≤ γ s (G) ≤ 2k+2. Let S be a minimum global secure set of G. Since G is 2-regular, every vertex in S must have another neighbor in S, so S is a total dominating set of G. Then, γ s (G) ≥ γ o (G). In [2, p. 367-369] , it was shown that γ o (C 4k+2 ) = 2k + 2.
Global secure sets of C 3 × C 4k+2
Let S be a global secure set of C 3 × C 4k+2 . Consider C 3 × C 4k+2 as an array with 3 rows and 4k + 2 columns. A column is an attacker column if it contains at most one vertex in S, otherwise it is a defender column. An attacker group is a maximal consecutive sequence of attacker columns. A defender group is a maximal consecutive sequence of defender columns. The groups are taken cyclically around the leftmost and rightmost columns. So, if the leftmost and rightmost columns are both attacker (defender) columns, the two columns belong to the same group. Notice if |S| = 6k + 3, then there is at least one attacker group and at least one defender group, in which case the number of attacker groups is equal to the number of defender groups. Fig. 1 enumerates the possible non-isomorphic attacker groups in a C 3 × C 4k+2 . In Fig. 1 and subsequent figures (where applicable), each configuration corresponds to a partial projection of a global secure set of the entire graph, where the vertices in the set are marked in black. The enumeration process terminates when the configuration is either not secure, or not dominating, in which case either a witness or an undominated vertex is boxed in the figure. The enumeration is exhaustive, with rotations and reflections of the same configuration omitted. Then, the only possible attacker groups of Fig. 2 , along with isomorphic (under vertical rotation) configurations. Thus, any attacker group of C 3 × C 4k+2 consists of either one or two columns.
We will refer to attacker groups in Fig. 2 as attacker groups type I through IV, without explicit reference to Fig. 2 repetitively. A column is empty if it contains no vertex in S. An attacker group may contain one or two consecutive empty columns, corresponding to attacker group types I and II respectively. We now proceed by case analysis based on the number of attacker groups of type II in C 3 × C 4k+2 . 
, with indexes wrapping around over {1, 2, . . . , t}, the number of attackers must equal the number of defenders in
Since the number of attackers equals the number of defenders in each A i ∪D i and A i ∪D i−1 , the enumerations terminating with fewer attackers than defenders (a < d) in 
a contradiction to S being a secure set. Proof. Assume |S| = 6k + 3. By Lemma 5, if A is an attacker group and D is a defender group adjacent to A, then Fig. 4(a) and (b) present all non-isomorphic configurations of A ∪ D. Recall that attacker and defender groups are maximal with respect to the number of consecutive attacker and defender columns they contain. Then, pattern (i) in Fig. 4 (a) and (b) cannot exist in S because the single column defender group would be next to an empty column and another attacker column, in which case the vertices in the defender group form a witness set.
Corollary 7. Let G be a graph and S
The remaining three possible configurations have different numbers of defender columns in their defender groups, and different numbers of defenders in their attacker groups. We claim that configuration S is composed of repeated patterns of exactly one type of A ∪ D groups. For example, if S contains adjacent attacker/defender groups that are instances of pattern (iii) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b) ), then all adjacent attacker/defender groups of S are instances of pattern (iii) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b) Fig. 4(a) . This implies D 1 must consist of exactly three columns. Then, in D 1 ∪ A 2 , the only valid choice from Fig. 4(b) is pattern (iii) because it is the only pattern where the defender group consists of exactly three columns. In turn, this implies A 2 must consist of a single empty column. Now consider A 2 ∪ D 2 . Patterns (i) and (iii) in Fig. 4(a) have attacker groups consisting of exactly one empty column, but we established in the previous paragraph that (i) cannot occur. Thus, the only valid pattern for A 2 ∪ D 2 is (iii) of Fig. 4(a) .
Similar arguments hold for the remaining groups.
Next, we claim that pattern (iii) and (iv) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b) ) cannot occur in S. If there is a pattern of type (iii) (or (iv)), by the argument in the previous paragraph the entire configuration must consist of only patterns of type (iii) (or (iv)). But, since pattern (iii) (or (iv)) has 4 columns, the total number of columns of C 3 × C 4k+2 must be a multiple of 4, an impossibility.
Finally, we show that it is also impossible for S to be composed of only instances of pattern type (ii) in Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b) ). Fig. 5 enumerates the possible configurations of S that consist of only instances of type (ii) patterns, with possible vertical reflection and rotation applied to different instances. In the enumeration, the columns must alternate between a column with exactly one vertex in S and a column with exactly two vertices in S. Note that, if a vertex v ∈ S has two neighbors outside S, then the other two neighbors of v must be in S, for otherwise {v} is a witness. Situations like this are noted by an arrow pointing from v to the neighbor of v that must be included in S. If a configuration is not secure, then either a witness is boxed, or a vertex w ∈ S is labeled, where for all u ̸ ∈ S, (N(u) ∩ S) − (N[w] ∩ S) ̸ = ∅ (Corollary 7). Fig. 5 shows that there are no secure set configurations for C 3 × C 4k+2 when the configuration consists of only instances of type (ii) patterns in Fig. 4(a) and (b) . Lemma 9 will be used in the proof of Lemma 10, to show that |S| > 6k + 3 if S contains exactly one attacker group of type II. 
Let A 1 , D 1 , . . . , A t , D t be attacker and defender groups of S. More specifically, let A 1 be the attacker group c 1 ∪ c 4k+2 , D 1 be the defender group which contains c 2 , A 2 be the attacker group to the right (increase in column number) of D 1 , D 2 the defender group to the right of A 2 , and so on. Note that all attacker groups, with the exception of A 1 , must be of type III or IV. With this notation, D t contains column c 4k+1 .
We claim that t ≥ 2. If t = 1, then A 1 is the only attacker group in S. But columns of A 1 are c 1 and c 4k+2 , which are not included in X . Thus, X contains only defender columns, or
since X contains at least two columns. 
The columns in
With reference to Fig. 3 , consider enumerations that start with attacker groups of type III or IV. The valid partial configurations that are also terminal configurations are shown in Fig. 6 . These are valid partial configurations of A j ∪ D j for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. Each partial configuration shows the entire attacker group, but may show only part of the defender group.
By examining each configuration, we may establish
(1)
Notice c 3 must be a defender column, for otherwise vertices in c 2 form a witness. Similarly, c 4k must be a defender column. Note that strict inequality in (2) may be possible, since d 2 + d 3 may contain other defender columns of D 1 and D t , which are not accounted for on the right hand side. Now, consider attacker columns of X . Since t ≥ 2 and |A t | ≤ 2, inequalities (1) and (2) give 
j=2 p 2,j and
The d 
Recall that Fig. 6 shows valid partial configurations of a given attacker group in X and the adjacent defender group to its right. Since p 3,j = 0, patterns (iii), (iv) and (vi) must not appear in X . In addition, since |A j | = |D j |, patterns (i), (ii) and (v) are no longer partial configurations, because any additional defender columns for the defender groups will make p 1,j < p 2,j . Then, possible patterns for A j ∪ D j , 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 are shown in Fig. 7(a) .
Next, consider D j ∪ A j+1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. Note that D j ∪ A j+1 are columns in X , and A j+1 is an attacker group of type III or IV. Enumerations of possible defender groups to the left of A j+1 are exact reflections of those shown in Fig. 3 . Since d 3 = 0, the only possible partial patterns for D j ∪ A j+1 are shown in Fig. 7(b) . These patterns are partial because they contain the entire attacker group, but may contain only part of the defender group. Nonetheless, 
Let a j and d j , respectively, be the number of attackers and defenders in X j , for j ∈ {1, 2}. 1 . So, i, and thus 4k + 2 − i are even. Then, either i ≡ 2(mod 4) or (4k + 2 − i) ≡ 2(mod 4). So, either X 1 ∩ S or X 2 ∩ S is a counter example to the inductive hypothesis. Thus, the assumption |S| = 6k + 3 is false and |S| > 6k + 3.
Global secure sets of C 7 × C 4k+2
Observation 12. Let G = (V , E) be a graph and S be a secure set of G. For x, y ∈ V , if x, y ∈ S or x, y ̸ ∈ S, then S is a secure set of G ′ = (V , E ∪ {xy}).
Theorem 13. γ s (C 7 × C 4k+2 ) = 14k + 7 for k ≥ 1. Proof. By Theorem 3, 14k + 7 ≤ γ s (C 7 × C 4k+2 ) ≤ 14k + 8. We show that γ s (C 7 × C 4k+2 ) ≤ 14k + 7 by exhibiting a global secure set of cardinality 14k +7 for C 7 ×C 4k+2 . The construction technique follows those in [12] . Fig. 8(a) and (b) show global secure set configurations for C 7 × P 6 and C 7 × P 4 respectively. The validity of these configurations has been checked by a computer program. Consider the disjoint union of one copy of the global secure set configuration of C 7 × P 6 and k − 1 copies of the global secure set configuration of C 7 × P 4 . The leftmost and rightmost columns of each of these configurations are identical. By Observation 12, adding edges between corresponding vertices on these columns results in a global secure set of C 7 × C 4k+2 . The cardinality of this set is 21 + 14(k − 1) = 14k + 7. Fig. 8(c) illustrates the result of this construction.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown γ s (C 4k+2 ) = 2k + 2, γ s (C 3 × C 4k+2 ) = 6k + 4 and γ s (C 7 × C 4k+2 ) = 14k + 7. The global security number of any grid-like graph is known. 
